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HOW TO REPAIR UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTS

INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following situation. As a student in a law school course, you are
regularly assigned a daily reading load of 20 pages in preparation for the next
day’s class. Yesterday, however, you received an extraordinary assignment of 200
pages, clearly more than you can feasibly prepare in one day. What should you
do? Should you resort to the normal, “reasonable” practice of preparing 20 pages?
Or should you, perhaps, disregard the unreasonable command of 200 altogether
and in the absence of any other affirmative instruction read 0 pages? Or, perhaps
yet, should you disregard only the unreasonable increment of the command and
prepare the maximal tolerable level, of say, 50 pages?
This dilemma, I argue, is similar to one that is at the core of several basic
doctrines of contract law. When a party with bargaining power dictates a contract
term that is excessive or invalid, the law has to set a substitute provision. Should
the excessive term be replaced by the most reasonable majoritarian term
(analogous to 20 pages in the above hypothetical)? Should the dictating party be
“punished”— incentivized not to go too far—by replacing the bad term with
something least favorable to her (analogous to 0 pages)? Or, should the excessive
term be reduced merely to the highest level that the law considers tolerable
(analogous to 50 pages)?
This paper explores the problem of how-to-repair-excessive-terms and illustrates
its solutions in existing law. There is no single compelling approach to this
problem and, indeed, as Part I of the paper shows, all three solutions can be traced
across different contexts and legal traditions. Still, the analysis in this paper
focuses primarily on the third regime—the one that intervenes minimally and
reduces the excessive term only to the maximally tolerable level. This regime
received less analytical attention than I think it deserves.
It might plausibly be conjectured, before reading this paper, that the maximallytolerable criterion is esoteric, an academic curiosity at best. Surely, so goes the
conjecture, if a court takes the trouble to correct an excessive term in the contract,
it would naturally replace that term with the most reasonable alternative, not with
a barely tolerable one. Why let a party who overreached get away the maximum
allowable advantage? The paper demonstrates, perhaps surprisingly, that the
maximally-tolerable criterion is quite prevalent. It shows how courts use it in a
variety of legal contexts as a mainstream solution to the problem of excessive and
unconscionable terms. One such doctrine is partial enforcement (and its archaic
predecessor, the Blue Pencil Rule), and its application in the context of covenantsnot-to-compete. I show that when non-compete clauses are excessive, they are
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generally brought down to the maximally tolerable level. Another doctrine studied
here is unconscionability: what do courts do when a term is struck as
unconscionable? Quite often, it turns out, the vacated term is replaced with the
maximally tolerable one, most favorable to the strong party. Yet another example
involves the judicial supervision of liquidated damages. In many legal traditions,
excessive liquidated damages are reduced to the maximally tolerable level—the
measure closest to the agreed sum, such that if it were the one agreed upon in the
first place, the court would have enforced it.
Before it surveys the doctrinal prevalence of the maximally-tolerable criterion, the
analysis in the paper sets up the context in which the criterion operates, and
provides a theoretical foundation for such regime. Part I of the paper identifies the
maximally tolerable regime as one of three discrete and conceptually coherent
solutions to the problem of excessive terms. Part II of the paper then analyzes the
conceptual grounding of the maximally tolerable criterion—the legal principles
with which it is consistent and how it ties with other practices in various areas of
the law. It shows that what underlies the maximally tolerable term approach is a
specific conception of severability (or divisibility) of contractual provisions, and
that the principle of waiver can lead to a similar solution. Further, this Part
demonstrates the prevalence of similar solutions in other areas of the law, outside
contract law.
Part III of the paper offers a brief cross-doctrinal survey and invites the reader to
recognize that the maximally tolerable principle has broader and more subtle
application than one might expect. Recognizing the instances in which this regime
applies and when it is rejected sets the stage for the normative inquiry in Part IV,
which suggests several justifications for this practice. The normative defense is
anything but straightforward. Admittedly, there is something objectionable about
a legal rule that accords the strong party, who already overreached in exploiting
its bargaining strength, the maximally tolerable term. Why not reform the contract
more aggressively? If courts already step in, why not take the opportunity to undo
the effects of unfettered bargaining power? Legal solutions that favor the weak
party, that level the playing field, are usually more appealing. Moreover, how do
courts account for the bad incentives that maximally tolerable terms generate—
the incentive to draft excessive terms, knowing that at most courts will only strike
down the excrescence?
The key observation made here, in justifying the use of maximally tolerable
terms, is that the problem of repairing unconscionable contracts is merely a
species of gap-filling. The court that vacated an excessive term has to decide how
fill the newly created gap. If the court merely provides a gap-filler, it cannot be
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too ambitious and it cannot undo (even it tries) the existence of uneven bargaining
power, or else its policy might backfire.
Indeed, the theme of this paper is part of a more general thesis concerning a
principle of gap-filling in contracts between parties that have unequal bargaining
power. This thesis, which I develop elsewhere, 1 suggests that standard gap-filling
approaches do not provide a workable prescription when the gap in the contract
involves a purely distributive aspect that parties bargain over (such as price).
Gaps of this sort cannot be filled with “surplus-maximizing” terms because more
than one term maximizes the surplus—in fact, the choice of gap-filler is surplusneutral. As it turns out, gaps are purely distributive quite often. Ironically, many
of the cases in contracts casebooks that introduce the topic of gap-filling involve
purely distributive gaps over issues such as price, for which the prescription
“choose the terms that maximize the total surplus” does not provide a definitive
solution.
To resolve this indeterminacy, a new principle of gap-filling is needed, of
mimicking the bargain: the division of the surplus that would have been struck
between these parties, given the allocation of bargaining power. It is not a mimicthe-parties’-will conception—there is no joint will to mimic. Rather, it is a
bargain-mimicking conception of gap-filling, which requires courts to fill gaps
with terms that are sensitive to the division of bargaining power, more favorable
to the party with the greater bargaining power.
Thus, continues my argument, if courts have to fill a gap that arises from the
elimination of an explicit (but excessive) term, the bargain-mimicking conception
would dictate the term closest to the hypothetical bargain. More aggressive
intervention would fail to achieve any redistributive results that might
superficially underlie it.
In the end, though, the paper recognizes that any justification for the maximally
tolerable rule must account for the incentive problem and for the concern that this
rule would induce strong parties to draft excessive terms. The analysis concludes
by showing that this concern limits the application of the maximally tolerable
regime, both in theory and in practice.
This paper intends to fill a vacuum in the study of unconscionability and related
doctrine. Much ink has been spilled on the questions what is (and should be) the
threshold of unconscionability and when intervention is justified. In the last
1

Omri Ben-Shahar, “A Bargaining Power Theory of Gap Filling”, Mimeo. (University of
Michigan Law School, 2007).
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decade this question returned to fore when various types of mandatory arbitration
terms were held to be unconscionable. But no systematic discussions emerged
regarding the “remedial” aspect—how to repair contracts that contain excessively
one-sided terms. This paper provides a conceptual framework to consider this
problem (by identifying the three competing solutions) and takes a first shot at
justifying one possible solution.

I. THE PROBLEM OF EXCESSIVE TERMS
A. Excessive Terms
When bargaining power is unevenly distributed, the strong party would naturally
use its bargaining leverage to draft one-sided, self serving terms. It is a basic
premise of contract law that courts ought not evaluate or even inquire into the
adequacy of consideration, however unequal the values exchanged. 2 As long as a
bargain was struck without coercion or fraud, each party bears the consequences
of its poor bargain.
But when the unevenness of bargaining power leads to terms that are intolerable,
courts are willing to step in. This might be true even for simple, easy-tounderstand terms such as price, although such instances are extremely rare. 3
Intervention is more likely to occur when the excessive terms are less conspicuous
than the price and are less well understood by the weak party, suggesting that
flaws existed in the manner in which assent was reached. This may be the case for
late payment terms and late fees, disclaimers and exclusionary clauses.
Intervention is even more justified when the boilerplate terms frustrate the
induced legitimate expectations of the weak party—a phenomenon that is of
particular concern in insurance contracts.4 More recently, an increasing number of
courts find arbitration terms in consumer and employment contracts, which are
excessively favorable to the drafters (sellers or employers), to contain
unconscionable elements. 5

2

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 79 Comment c., § 208 Comment d.
See WHITE AND SUMMERS, 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4.5 at 223 (4th Ed. 1995) (“reported
litigation based on excessive price has dwindled to a trickle.”)
4
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211(3), cmt f; C&J Fertilizer v. Allied Mutual, 227 N.W.2d
169 (Ia. 1975).
5
Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability,
52 Buffalo L. Rev. 185 (2004); Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services Inc., 6 P.3d
669 (Cal.2000); Brower v. Gateway 2000, 246 A.D.2d 246 (N.Y. 1998).
3
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The unconscionability doctrine is not the only way to limit excessive onesidedness in contracts. In some specific areas, terms that are drafted one-sidedly
may be struck without reference to the unconscionability standard. For example,
liquidated damages that are clearly over-compensatory are considered punitive
and unenforceable. 6 Although the standard determining what constitutes
unreasonably large liquidated damage can at times be identical to the “shock the
conscience” standard of unconscionability, 7 it is generally less strict. Or, in
another area, covenants not to compete with a business or an employer may be
found intolerable if the duration or the geographic scope of the non-compete
obligation is too long or too broad. Finally, in some areas of contracting there are
statutory caps that determine the maximal allowable stretch of the bargain. Usury
laws and price gouging acts are typical examples of a maximum constraint; lemon
laws and minimum wage laws are examples of minimum constraints. If the
contract contains bargained-for terms that are outside these regulatory limits, the
terms can be struck.
When an excessive term is invalidated, there is a gap in the contract that calls for
gap-filling. It should be noted, though, that courts are not always ready to fill the
gap and historically they have elected not to do so. Instead, when a contract
contained an unconscionable element, the entire contract was rendered
unenforceable. 8 It was not considered the role of the courts to write the contract
over, in a more reasonable fashion, for the parties. Even today, when the
unconscionability of some terms is linked to flawed assent, as in the case of
duress or fraud, courts may refuse to supply the more reasonable terms and
instead vacate the entire agreement. 9 Beyond the contract law consequences,
overreaching can give rise to civil and criminal penalties such as disgorgement,
fines and damage multipliers. 10
Modern courts have less trouble reforming the contract and enforcing it.
Unconscionability statutes provide clear authority to do so. For example, Section
2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code allows courts to “limit the application of
any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.” 11 Even more
explicit, under the Principles of European Contract Law, a court may “adapt the
contract in order to bring it into accordance with what might have been agreed
6

UCC §2-718(1) (“A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.”)
See, e.g., Leeber v. Deltona Corp., 546 A.2d 452 (Maine 1988).
8
See Earl of Chesterfild v. Janssen, 28 Eng.Rep. 82 (Ch.1750).
9
See Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related
Doctrines, 60 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1993) (comparing the two approaches).
10
See Federal Price Gouging Prevention Act, H.R. 1252, 110th Cong. §§ 3-4 (2007); Fair labor
Standard Act, 29 U.S.C.A §16(b).
11
UCC § 2-302(1). See also Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 5.108(3).
7
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had the requirements of good faith and fair dealing been followed.” 12 There
remains some debate whether courts can affirmatively replace the offending term
with a different one not drafted by the parties, or whether they are restricted to
crossing out existing terms and letting the legal gap-fillers set in. Section III of the
paper reviews some of this debate. It demonstrates that many courts believe that
they have sufficient authority to reduce an excessive term to any level they deem
appropriate.
When the court decides to enforce the contract and reform the excessive term, it
has to apply some principled policy in choosing the new term. True, this is not the
“pure” gap-filling scenario of a contract that contains a lacuna and needs
supplementation. Rather, this is an artificial gap that arises out of a legal policy
that eliminates an existing express term. Nevertheless, this is a situation in which
technically there is no longer an express provision in an otherwise enforceable
contract and a new provision needs to be supplied. In the same way that courts
need to turn to a gap-filling methodology when they knock out non-matching
express terms in a battle of the forms, 13 courts need to follow a systematic gapfilling pattern when repairing unconscionable terms.
B. Three Solutions
When the excessive term is struck down and a gap is created in the contract, how
should this gap be filled? Courts generally follow one of three possible
approaches.
1. The Most Reasonable Term. The standard criterion for filling gaps in contracts
is to supply the most reasonable, majoritarian term. While this criterion is more
often identified with gap-filling in indefinite contract or as a solution to the battle
of the forms, it is also a sensible solution to the gap arising from the invalidated
excessive term. Thus, if the price is unconscionable, replace it with a reasonable,
intermediate level market price.14 If a liquidated damages remedy is excessive
and punitive, replace it with standard expectation damages, measured by the
contract-cover differential or by lost profits, excluding any uncommonly high
consequential damages.

12

Principles of European Contract Law, Article 4.109 (2002).
It is common to apply gap-fillers in situations in which the gap arises, not from indefiniteness in
drafting, but from the knock-out of an express term. Compare UCC §2-204(3) (gap-fillers apply to
“open terms”) and UCC §2-207(3) (gap-fillers apply as a result of the knock out of express terms.)
14
See, e.g., Aristides N. Hatzis and Eleni Zervogianni, Judge-Made Contracts: Restructuring
Unconscionable Contracts (Mimeo., 2007).
13
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Often, this solution of supplying the most reasonable mid-range term arises
implicitly. A court might strike the offensive term and make no affirmative
substitution. The default rule would then apply, effectively supplying a reasonable
provision. For example, if an unconscionable arbitration term is struck, the court
need not select an affirmative gap-filler; in the absence of an arbitration provision,
parties resolve their dispute in court. Or, if an exclusionary clause in an insurance
policy is unconscionable, it falls and the insurer’s obligation is read without it.
Here, even if the court does not pay explicit attention to the principle underlying
the gap filling process, it often chooses an outcome that is consistent with a mostreasonable-term approach.
There is much to be said, of course, in support of this regime. The mostreasonable-terms are, by definition, the most compelling ex-post solution.
Contractors are allowed to deviate from them, within limits, and a court would
normally let such deviations stand. But if the court deemed the situation fit for
intervention, why not take the opportunity and write the most balanced
contractual term for the parties?
2. The Most Unfavorable Term. If the drafting party overreached by trying to
secure an excessive gain, the court can “punish” this behavior by depriving this
party of the entire advantage. The contract is enforced, but the excessive term is
supplemented by a term least favorable (within reason) to the drafting party. Thus,
for example, if a creditor bargained for excessive, usurious interest rate, a court
can replace it with 0% interest. If the duration of a non-compete clause is
excessive, the court can strike altogether, effectively replacing it with zero
duration. In fact, in some scenarios the example mentioned above of a vacated
arbitration term can be regarded as an illustration of the most-unfavorable-term
approach. The most reasonable gap-filler, it can be argued, is a fair and balanced
arbitration arrangement that would replace the one-sided arbitration term that was
struck. Eliminating arbitration altogether and sending the dispute to court is a way
to punish the overreaching party and tilting the result in favor of the other party.
This gap filling approach is punitive in the same way as the doctrine of contra
proferentum. It is not intended to identify the most balanced outcome, ex post.
Instead, it is intended to induce the drafter to make drafting choices that would
not overreach and would not necessitate court intervention in the first place. It is a
species of a penalty default rule, and as such it is consistent with the same policy
concerns that supposedly justify penalty rules: forcing a party who enjoys a
bargaining advantage (here, superior bargaining power) to forgo some of the gains
that he can extract.
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3. The Maximally Tolerable Term. Finally, if a term is considered excessive, it
can be broken down to two distinct components: the maximally tolerable portion,
and everything beyond it. Once the second component—the excessive increment
is eliminated, the remainder is no longer unconscionable (even if still relatively
one-sided), and does not necessitate further intervention. This remainder—the
maximally allowable term—would be enforceable.
To compare the three solutions, consider a situation in which the reasonable price
of a service is $500. If purchased under conditions of a thick market, the price
would always be $500. But situations arise in which one of the parties may
experience urgency or vulnerability, or, alternatively, enjoy bargaining leverage,
such that the price for the same service may reflect those circumstances. Assume
that it is not unreasonable to charge as much $750 to a buyer-in-need, or to pay as
little as $250 to a desperate seller. Thus, any price within the range of $250 and
$750 would be enforceable. But what if the service provider exploits her
bargaining power to charge an unreasonable price of $1000, and this price gets
struck by court? Under the most reasonable term approach, the gap-filler would
be $500—this is the term that most comports with the community standards of
fairness. 15 Under the unfavorable term approach, the gap filler would be $250 (or
perhaps even lower, if the stated purpose is not merely to repair the contract, but
to punish the offender.) And under the maximally tolerable term approach, the
gap-filler would be $750—the maximal price within the tolerable range.
II. MAXIMALLY TOLERABLE TERMS: A CONCEPTUAL INTRODUCTION
Two of the three solutions discussed above are familiar to most readers. Both the
most-reasonable-term and the unfavorable-term approaches have an intuitive
appeal and are based on premises that are shared by more prominent theories of
gap-filling and contract interpretation. They can be viewed as analogous to the
two familiar criteria for default rules – majoritarian and penalty defaults. I have
nothing more to say about these approaches and I will therefore focus in the
remainder of this paper on the third regime—the maximally-tolerable-terms. This
regime is based on a principle that many might find, upon first reflection,
objectionable. It allows a party who acted poorly (by overreaching) to escape with
minimum sanction. This leniency might seem both unjust and a weak deterrent.
Since my goal here is to dispel some of this intuitive rejection of the maximally
tolerable principle, I begin in this section with analysis of its conceptual
grounding. I hope to show that that the maximally tolerable principle is consistent

15

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 204 Comment d.
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with some fundamental premises regarding contract enforcement. This will help
understand, later, why this rule is quite prominent in practice.
A. Maximum Terms and the Freedom to Bargain
Parties are entitled to engage in tough negotiations, maneuver for advantages, and
insist on self-serving contractual terms. Drafting a contract that contains terms
other than the most reasonable ones is not illegal nor is it uncommon. It is only
when these advantages are excessive—when they reach beyond a level that is
regarded as tolerable—that the law steps in to invalidate them. Thus, if a court is
to reform the excessive contract, it is only the illegitimate element of the onesided term that needs to be struck. Effectively, then, the court would fill the gap
with a term that is still one-sided, still favorable to the same party who dictated
the original excessive term, but moderated sufficiently so that it would be
tolerable—so as to fit it within the range that is considered legitimate.
This solution preserves to the maximum the bargaining advantage secured in the
contract. It is therefore the one most consistent with the idea that bargaining
power ought to be respected, not undone. In a companion paper, I examine the
merits of a new criterion for filling gaps in purely distributive terms (such as
price). Under that criterion, gaps should be filled in a way that reflects the relative
bargaining power of the parties. 16 Specifically, the court-supplied term ought to
resemble as much as possible the term that the parties would have negotiated
expressly, even if such a term clearly favors the stronger party. This idea is based
on normative grounding: if there is a range in which parties are allowed to
bargain, the best that default rules can do is mimic the point within this range that
the parties would hypothetically choose.
The maximally tolerable term that is discussed here is consistent with this more
general bargain-mimicking idea because it reflects the relative bargaining power
of the parties. To be sure, it is not a pure bargain-mimicking term. The perfect
mimicking term was in fact written in the contract, and yet it was found
unenforceable under a policy aimed at limiting the reach of bargaining power.
Obviously, the court should not reinstate the same term it has just struck down.
What the court would mimic here is the hypothetical bargain that parties
negotiating over a truncated domain would reach. This solution accords with a
“general duty of the court to preserve so much of a contract as may properly

16

Omri Ben-Shahar, “A Bargaining Power Theory of Gap Filling”, Mimeo. (University of
Michigan Law School, 2007).
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survive its invalid and ineffective provisions” 17 —namely, to enforce the entire
contract minus the excessive increment.
B. Grounds for Intervention
Under doctrines like unconscionability which are intended to provide relief from
extreme terms, there is no clear authority or justification for courts to provide
more than the minimum necessary relief. The court’s authority to intervene in the
contract and to police its terms arises from the fact that an express term lies
beyond society’s tolerable range. The further out this term relative to what is
tolerable, the greater the justification for intervention. Once the offensive term has
been pushed into the tolerable range, even if only barely so, there is no remaining
justification for intervention.
One way to reinforce this idea is by considering the following synthetic
illustration. Imagine again the case in which the contract contains an excessive
price, $1000, and suppose that the process of adjusting the price involves a
gradual examination of successively lower prices. That is, after deciding that
$1000 is too high, the court considers one price lower, say $990. If that price is
also unconscionable, the court considers a further incremental reduction, to $980.
It continues similarly step-by-incremental-step until it reaches a price which is no
longer considered intolerable. Once that price is reached, the process of adjusting
the price downwards would then stop. There will be no remaining justification—
at least not under direct policy grounds that give rise to the unconscionability
redress—for further adjustments of the price beyond this threshold.
Put differently, if we analogize the process of judicial intervention in the contract
to a force that pulls the price from its current intolerable level towards the
permissible region, the force gradually weakens as the price gets closer to the
tolerable level, and vanishes completely as soon as this level is hit. The point
where this adjustment process runs out of justification is not the mid-range,
majoritarian, most-balanced term. Rather, it is the maximally tolerable price: it is
still a one-sided term, albeit not as bad as the original term.
Conceptually, this argument is consistent with the language that authorizes court
intervention in unconscionable contract. If, as the UCC instructs, courts are
authorized “to limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result,” 18 this authority to further tinker with any clause expires
once the term is no longer unconscionable.
17
18

Anders v. Hometown Mortgage Services Inc., 346 F.3d 1024, 1032 (Ala. 2003).
UCC § 2-302
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This argument goes some distance towards justifying the maximal tolerable terms.
It is based on the logic that if legal intervention in the contract is justified by a
particular distributive concern, it is also limited by this very concern. There are
several equivalent ways to articulate this claim. One is to compare a contract that
contains the maximally tolerable price term with a contract that is all else equal,
but contains an even worse price term. If there is no good reason to intervene in
the former, is there a reason to intervene in the latter beyond fixing it to look like
the former? We shall see later, there may be incentive-based reasons for a more
aggressive intervention in the latter contract. But those are different than the
distributive concerns justifying the intervention in the first place. Another
equivalent way of saying this is to focus on the complaint of the weak party. This
party has no reasonable grounds to demand more than the minimal redress
tailored by the maximally tolerable term. Once accorded this adjustment, what
basis does he have for demanding additional relief? 19
C. Cross-Doctrinal Foundations
This conceptual defense of the idea of minimum-necessary-relief accords with
other deep-rooted practices of the law in general, and contract law in particular,
which entitle a party to concede a greater contested claim in order to secure a
smaller uncontested claim. For example, the doctrine of remittitur deals with
excessive jury verdicts in civil trials. The judge determines the portion of the
verdict that is excessive and gives the plaintiff the option to remit—to concede—
this increment, or face a new trial. The verdict is not entirely voided, nor is it
replaced with the most reasonable amount. Rather, only the excrescence—the sum
which exceeds “the highest amount which the jury properly could have
awarded”—is lopped off. 20 Many courts have specifically rejected the more
intrusive approach, which reduces the excessive judgment to the level that is most
fair. Instead, they prefer the minimal intervention approach, reducing the
judgment “to the maximum that would be upheld by the trial court as not
excessive.” 21

19

This rationale is recognized by Corbin: “The line [representing the enforceable term] must be
drawn somewhere, and it is drawn at the point where the protection to which the buyer is justly
entitled ends.” See Arthur L. Corbin, On the Doctrine of Beit v. Beit: A Comment, 23 Conn.B.J.
40, 46 (1949).
20
Dick v. Watonwan Co., 562 F. Supp. 1083, 1108 (1983); See, generally, 11 WRIGHT, MILLER,
AND KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 167 (2d ed. 1995).
21
Earl v. Bouchard Transportation Co., Inc., 917 F.2d 1320, 1328 (2d Cir., 1990)
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There is more than geometric resemblance between remittitur and the maximally
tolerable terms principle. Both are based on a premise that an “outcome” can lie
within a range, and as long as it is within the range there is no ground for
intervention. In the remittitur, context, the outcome is the jury’s judgment
regarding damages. It does not have to be a balanced mid-range compromise
between the litigants opposing positions. It can lean towards one party, but not in
an unreasonable, intolerable fashion. If it goes outside this region, it is pushed
back in. This practice is analogous to the maximum tolerable terms principle in
contract law.
Within contract law too, one can find the roots of the idea that excessive
provisions can be cured by incremental, rather than total, invalidation. A party
may concede a gap in the contract in favor of the other party in order to cure
indefiniteness and enforce the conceded contract. 22 Indeed, as we shall see in the
next section, it is quite common for parties who lose their case in defense of an
unconscionable term to concede the offensive element and ask the court to
enforce the remainder. Many courts are receptive to such requests. 23
More generally, the idea of minimum necessary relief can be embedded in the
doctrine of waiver. The drafting party is treated as accepting a reduction of the
self-serving term, waiving her right to insist on full unlimited enforcement of that
term. With the waiver in place, there is no remaining ground for intervention. As
the Supreme Court of Texas recognized in this context:
“Even thought the contract may be illegal and unenforceable as
written, one of the parties may make it legal and enforceable by
offering to take out of it the offending provision that makes it
illegal… 24
D. Identifying the Maximal Threshold
While the criterion underlying the maximally tolerable terms—the upper bound of
the legitimate range of contracting—may be conceptually coherent in the abstract,
is it implementable by courts? Is it possible to adjudicate this criterion and
identify the threshold? There are aspects to this inquiry regarding the practicality
of the criterion that implicate the normative discussion, and will be postponed till
later. For it might be possible to identify the maximally tolerable threshold but

22

1 Farnsworth on Contracts §3.29 (3rdEd. 1999); Ben-Shahar, Agreeing to Disagree: Filling
Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2004 Wisc. L.Rev. 389, 421.
23
See, infra, text accompanying notes 48 to 53.
24
Lewis v. Krueger, Hutchinson and Overton Clinic, 269 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. 1954).
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only at an increased adjudication cost, in which case the normative argument in
favor of this criterion would weaken.
I believe that there are many scenarios in which it is possible to identify a
maximally tolerable level. Section III below demonstrates how courts manage
fairly easily to follow this criterion. In some situations the threshold is easy to
identify because it is expressly established by regulations. For example, in some
States the maximal scope of non-compete clauses in employment contracts is set
by statute. Likewise, the maximal interest rate to be charged for credit or for late
payment is regulated in every jurisdiction. Contracts that exceed these thresholds
can easily be reformed to the maximal statutorily permissible levels. We will see,
however, that in situations in which the threshold is crystal clear, there is also a
stronger suspicion that the overreaching occurred in bad faith. In these cases,
there is a stronger argument that the exceeding party ought to be punished and
deprived of more than just the excess.
In other situations, where the maximum threshold is not set forth in a statute,
courts can follow the principle of maximally tolerable terms without pinpointing
the precise maximum. As long as they do not err above the maximum, they can
cautiously set a term that, while still favorable to the drafting party, is
nevertheless not unreasonable. In the example above, the court does not need to
know that $750 is the uppermost tolerable level that can replace the struck-down
price of $1000. While the plaintiff is going to ask for a gap-filler equal the most
reasonable term of $500, the defendant might offer a higher price term, say $650
(perhaps the defendant already collected $650 and is willing to stop there.) As
long as the defendant’s proposed term is within the tolerable range, it is consistent
with the maximally tolerable criterion.
In some situations, a party drafting a mass-market contract may “experiment”
with a one-sided term (e.g., arbitration term, or exclusionary clause) that is
eventually held by courts to be overreaching. In time, the drafting party will
modify the boilerplate contract and offer a less extreme version of the one-sided
term to new customers. But what about the old customers that accepted the
original, excessive term? In these settings, the existence of a new, modified
version that survives the scrutiny of courts makes a good candidate for the
maximally tolerable term. This modified term would likely still be one-sided
relative to the most reasonable or balanced term, but it would be tolerable.
Moreover, there is ample evidence that the parties themselves believe that the
principle of maximally tolerable terms is implementable. As I will mention in the
next Section, many contracts include severability or savings clauses that instruct
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courts to enforce any provision that is found to be excessive to the maximal extent
permitted by law. If an interest rate is excessive, the maximal permissible rate
should apply; if a warranty disclaimer is too harsh, the maximal permissible
disclaimer applies; and so on. The parties themselves, it appears, believe in this
criterion.
In the end, it might still be difficult in some situations to identify a discrete
threshold for the maximally tolerable term; it might be much easier to resort to
market data and apply the most reasonable, majoritarian term. But the thesis of
this paper does not fail even under this shortcoming. The thesis is proposed in a
more tentative fashion: maximal tolerable terms ought to be considered as a way
to repair unconscionable contract to the extent that the court has information
about the maximal tolerable threshold. Such information, in other words, ought
not to be ignored.

III. DOCTRINAL APPLICATIONS
This section examines some existing practices that are consistent with the
maximally tolerable terms approach. It also identifies some instances in which
this criterion was expressly rejected. Overall, I hope to show that in many subtle
ways contract law applies an approach that is close to maximally tolerable terms
regime.
A. Severability Clauses
Before turning to legal rules that determine how to repair excessive terms, it is
important to note that such principles can be enacted in the contracts themselves.
Maximally tolerable gap-fillers can emerge in practice as a result of contractual
drafting that instructs courts to apply such a criterion. Specifically, a party who
drafts a self-serving standard form contract often adds a boilerplate severability
clause, stating:
If any provision in the contract is not permitted by governing law,
such provision shall not be construed to be null and of no effect, but
court shall construe the agreement to provide for the maximum
enforceable application. 25

25

Laurence H. Pretty, Patent Litigation, ex. 15-24, pp. 15-41 to 15-42. See also Charles
Sennewald, Security Consulting (“If the scope of any of the provisions of the agreement is too
broad in any respect whatsoever to permit enforcement to its full extent, then such provisions shall
be enforced to the maximum extent permitted by law, and the parties hereto consent and agree that
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Many contracts contain similar language, rendering a term enforceable “to the
maximal extent permitted by law.” For example, a lending term may stipulate that
the creditor is entitled to the “maximum rate” and that if the charged interest
exceeds the maximal permissible rate, the creditor should refund only the amount
of such excess. 26 Or, a warranty/liability term can disclaim all warranties or
damages to the maximum extent permitted by law. 27 These are situations in which
the parties anticipate the possibility that a one-sided term might be struck, and
instruct the courts specifically how to fill gaps in the agreement. The instruction is
for the court to follow a one-sided methodology, picking terms that are equivalent
to the maximal tolerable provisions.
Of course, courts can disregard such severability clauses, perhaps on the basis that
such terms oust the inherent jurisdiction of the court to choose a remedy for
wrongful behavior. Or, courts might consider the effect of such clauses to be
undesirable and contrary to public policy. But it would be difficult to strike these
clauses as unconscionable, because by their very language they refer to the
maximal level that is not unconscionable. 28
B. The Doctrine of Partial Enforcement

such scope may be judicially modified accordingly and that the whole of such provisions of this
agreement shall not thereby fail...”)
26
See, e.g., J Robert Brown and Herbert B. Max, Raising Capital: Private Placement Forms &
Techniques (“payee shall never be deemed to have contracted for, or be entitled to receive as
interest on this note, interest ….or any amount in excess of the Maximum rate. […] if the interest
received … exceeds the maximum rate, then payee shall refund the amount of such excess.”) See
also Richard T Williamson, Selling Real Estate Without Paying Taxes: A Guide to Capital Gains
Tax Alternatives 173 (“no payment or interest shall exceed the maximum amount permitted by
law. Any payment in excess of the maximum amount shall be [disbursed to the payor].”
27
See, e.g., Napster’s Terms and Conditions, available at www.napster.com/terms.html (“To the
Extent that in a particular circumstance any disclaim or limitation on damages or liability set forth
herein is prohibited by applicable law, then instead of the provision hereof […] Napster shall be
entitled to the maximum disclaimers and/or limitations on damage and liability available at law or
in equity…”). See also RealNetworks EULA (“To the maximum extent permitted by applicable
law, RealNetworks further disclaims all warranties”); Open Source License, in Andrew M. St.
Laurent, Understanding Open Source and Free Software Licensing; Altova term: (“Because some
states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability, the above limitation may not apply to
you. In such states, liability shall be limited to the maximal extent permitted by law.”) (emphasis
added)
28
Imagine, hypothetically, an arbitration clause that reads:
Any dispute arising out of this agreement will be arbitrated under the arbitration rules
of the AAA and take place in the state that is least convenient for the plaintiff, so long
as this is not too inconvenient to constitute an unconscionable burden.
Can this clause, with its built-in unconscionability constraint, be struck as unconscionable?
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The doctrine of partial performance is a method that enables courts to enforce a
term that is otherwise unreasonable or extreme in a partial, tolerable manner. The
archaic “Blue Pencil Rule” was the origin of this method. Under this rule, when a
contract contained an invalid term, the invalid portion would be literally crossed
out (by the metaphoric blue pencil). If the language that remained was
grammatically meaningful, it would be enforced. Otherwise, if the remainder was
not coherent without some affirmative rewriting, it was entirely invalid. 29 Here, if
the contract was selectively enforced, the remainder did not follow a principled
criterion – maximally tolerable or any other criterion. The outcome had an
arbitrary, inconsistent, aspect.
Yet there was an appealing feature to the Blue Pencil rule that the more modern
approach to partial enforcement sought to preserve. It was a technique that
allowed courts to depart from the older and even more rigid all-or-nothing regime,
which simply voided any unreasonable provision in its entirety. If the provision
were divisible, why not sever only the offensive part—the minimally necessary
part—and enforce the remainder? While such divisibility was the policy
underlying the Blue Pencil rule, the mechanical procedure of the rule significantly
limited its effectiveness. A better rule for partial enforcement could implement the
divisibility policy without constraining courts by a grammatical criterion.
Under the modern partial enforcement doctrine, a court is authorized to reform an
unreasonable term in a contract and enforce it to extent necessary to avoid the
unreasonableness. The court does not have to use the blue pencil method. It can
do more than just cross out some language and enforce the remainder. It can, in
addition, substitute the offensive language with a different provision. The
underlying goal is to give maximal effect to the parties’ agreement, subject to the
constraint of avoiding unreasonableness. 30 This goal it is often implemented by
amending the excessive term with the maximal tolerable term.
Perhaps the most striking (and most common) application of this partial
performance technique involves covenants not to compete. When an employee
enters an employment contract, he often signs a non-compete clause with the
employer, applicable in the event that the employment ends. Similarly, when a
business is sold with its good will, the seller often promises to not compete with
the buyer. These restraints are at times too harsh, either by setting too long a
duration of the non-compete period, or by defining the geographical boundaries of
the non-compete region too broadly. Old decisions in the all-or-nothing tradition
used to void these as unreasonable restraints altogether, and leave the parties free
29
30

FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 5.8 (4th Ed. 2004)
Williston and Corbin, On the Doctrine of Beit v. Beit, 23 Conn.B.J. 40, 49-50 (1949).
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of any restraint. 31 Even today, in some European legal traditions such excessive
restraints are considered void and may not be adjusted by courts.32 Blue Pencil
decisions—somewhat less strict—granted relief by partially enforcing the
restraints if they were grammatically meaningful without the offensive words. But
most courts nowadays substitute an offensive term with a maximally tolerable
one. 33
At times, the maximal tolerable level is defined explicitly be statutes. Some states
have enacted bright line rules stating the maximal duration of non-compete
clauses in employment contracts. In these states, when the contract contains a
non-compete term that is longer than the statutory cap, it is normally truncated to
be equal to that cap. 34 That is, only the increment of the restraint that is socially
intolerable is eliminated; the rest stands. In other states there is no bright line
statute. There, too, courts reduce the non-compete term, bringing it down to a
level that is tolerable. The restraint “is not enforceable beyond the time or area
considered reasonable by the court.” 35 The permissible duration varies across
circumstances and jurisdictions. Case law provides numerous examples for the
cap being set between 6 months to 10 years. 36
This approach can, and in fact applies to other contexts in which excessive terms
place unreasonable restraint on a party. Thus, for example, in a German case
31

The earliest case is Mitchell v. Reynolds (1711) 1 P Wms 181, 24 Eng Reprint 347. This rule
remained in force in England and in the U.S till the end of the 19th century. See C.T. Drechsler,
Enforceability of Restrictive Covenant, Ancillary to Employment Contract, as Affected by
Territorial Extent of Restriction, 43 A.L.R2d 94, §6(a).
32
See Aristides N. Hatzis and Eleni Zervogianni, Judge Made Contracts – Restructuring
Unconscionable Contracts, p. 6 (Mimeo., 2007) (citing German Law).
33
See, e.g., Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L.Rev. 625, 646651 (1960); Solari Industries, Inc. v. Malady, 264 A.2d 53 (N.J. 1970.).
34
See, e.g., §542.335(1)(d)1, Fl. Stat. (1997) (“a court… shall presume unreasonable in time any
restraint more than 2 years in duration”), enforced in Flickenger v. Fitzgerald & Co., 732 So.2d 33
(Fl. 1999); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §23.921C (2006); S.D. Codified Laws §53-9-11 (2007).
35
See, e.g., Justin Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex. 1974). In other countries the
unlawfulness of the restraint is a matter for the courts to determine, but again with the
consequence that if found unlawful, the restraint is not struck down in toto, but reduced to its
maximally tolerable level. For a French decision, see Cass. Soc., 21 October 1960, JCP
1960.II.11886, discussed in BEALE ET AL., CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXT ON CONTRACT LAW
312-313 (2002)
36
See, e.g., Kramer v. Robec, Inc., 824 F.Supp. 508, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (Pennsylvania court
reducing a 3 year restraint to 2 years; enforcing a geographical limit of the entire U.S.); Fullerton
Lumber v. Torborg, 70 N.W.2d 585 (Wisc. 1955) (Wisconsin court reducing a 10 year restraint to
3 years); American Weekly v. Patterson, 16 A.2d 912 (Md. 1940) (Maryland court reducing a 5
year restraint to 4 years); Foltz v. Struxness, 215 P.2d 133 (Kan. 1950) (Kansas court enforcing a
10 year restraint)

- 17 Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2007

17

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 80 [2007]

HOW TO REPAIR UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTS

dealing with an exclusive supply arrangement, in which the buyer was obligated
to purchase its entire requirements over 24 years from the seller, the court reduced
the exclusivity term to the maximal tolerable duration of 16 years. 37
The stated aim of this jurisprudence is to protect one party’s interest, as displayed
in the contract, without unreasonable hardship upon the other party. While this is
a cost-benefit test, it would be wrong to conclude that the courts are enforcing the
most efficient or most reasonable gap-filler. 38 Rather, courts view their role as
securing the bargain that the parties struck, recognizing the superior bargaining
power of one of the parties. The cost-benefit test is used to identify, not the
surplus maximizing term, but only what is excessive. A limitation that burdens an
employee without according benefit to the employer is deemed unreasonable.
Thus, in eliminating the unreasonable portion of the restraint, the court is setting
not the most reasonable or common term, nor a majoritarian or average provision,
but rather the maximally tolerable one.
It is important to recognize that the application of maximally tolerable terms in
this context is limited by a safety valve which will be discussed in more detail in
the normative analysis below. The concern is that the doctrine of partial
enforcement and the application of maximally tolerable terms might give drafters
incentives to dictate overly oppressive restraints, expecting to lose at worst only
the excessive increment but to keep it anytime it is not challenged. In light of this
concern, courts are ready to invalidate the entire non-compete clause (namely,
replace the duration term with zero) if there is evidence of deliberate
overreaching. 39 Maximally tolerable terms apply only if the crossing of the
boundary was done without bad faith. It might be difficult at times to ascertain
whether there was bad faith. A presumption of bad faith may exist when the noncompete restraint is unlimited in duration, and often courts indeed vacate such
restraint completely. 40
C. Unconscionability
1. Price and Interest Rates
37

BGH 16 and 17 September 1974, NJW 1974.2089. See also Beale et. al., supra note 35, at 313314.
38
In many contexts, the most common duration gap-filler is at-will termination—a zero restraint
on the right of an employee to walk away. See, e.g. UCC 2-309(2) (at-will termination in sales
contracts); Payne. V. Western & Atlantic R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519 (1884) (termination of
employment contract).
39
See, e.g., Central Adjustment Bureau v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 37 (Tenn.1984).
40
E.g., Harvest Ins. Agency v. Inter-Ocean Ins. Co. 492 N.E.2d 686, 690 (Ind. 1986).
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When a term in the contract is struck under the doctrine of unconscionability,
courts have broad discretion how to repair the contract. A common solution
would be to strike the offensive term and replace it with nothing, enforcing the
remainder of the contract. This, of course, is an implicit choice to replace the
excessive term with the default rule—the gap-filler that applies in the absence of
an express term. Thus, when the cross-collateral term was struck in Williams v.
Walker-Thomas, 41 it was replaced with the default rule that granted the seller no
special security in the buyer’s prior purchases.
This solution—replacing the offensive term with the legally supplied default
provision—would rarely end up with the maximally tolerable term. The legally
supplied gap fillers are normally the majoritarian, most-reasonable provisions and
do not favor the drafting party. Still, there are many circumstances in which the
court chooses to affirmatively redraft the term, and to set it at the maximally
tolerable terms. This is achieved by striking not the entire offensive term, but only
the increment of it that is found unconscionable. The remaining component could
still be one-sided, but no longer unconscionable. Corbin seems to have recognized
this criterion when he explained, in the context of a loan of money, that “a
contract that requires a payment of a very high interest will be enforced, up to the
point at which ‘unconscionability’ becomes an operative factor.” 42
In many cases, courts have effectively replaced an unconscionable term with
something that resembles the maximal tolerable term. Take, for example, the
classic door-to-door sale case, Toker v. Westerman, 43 in which the buyer agreed to
pay over $1200 for a refrigerator that normally sells for $400. After the buyer
paid more than $650, he sought relief from the oppressive price. The court indeed
struck down the price as unconscionable, but allowed the seller to keep the money
already paid. True, the court did not directly hold the seller is entitled to the
maximal tolerable price. The $650 figure happened to be the amount already paid
when the case was initiated. The buyer only asked for the remainder to be
unenforceable; he did not seek restitution of some of the money previously paid.
But in another case, in which the price was not yet paid, the court specifically
reversed a lower court’s stipulation of a low net-cost price, and allowed the seller

41

Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 f.2d 445 (D.C. Cut. 1965).
1 Corbin, Contracts § 129, p. 556 (1963) (emphasis added).
43
274 A.2d 78 (NJ, 1970). See also Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.
1969) (a $300 freezer was purchased for a price that exceeds $1400; the court allowed the buyers
to stop payments after $620 were paid): Bank of Indiana Bat’l Ass’n v. Holyfield, 476 F.Supp.
104 (Miss. 1979).
42
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to collect a price that included all indirect costs plus a reasonable profit. For a
product that has a thick market, this comes close to a maximal price. 44
Another implicit application of this approach comes from the decision of the
district court in the famous Batsakis v. Demotsis case. Recall that this case
involved a loan in Greek currency made in Greece during the war, which, in
nominal terms, amounted to the equivalent of $25. In return, the debtor promised
to pay $2000 plus interest after the war. When the time to pay the debt came, the
debtor reneged. The District Court in Texas found that the promise to pay $2000
for a loan of $25 was not enforceable, for lack of consideration. Sympathizing
with the debtor, but recognizing also that the contract cannot simply be voided
and undone, the court ordered the debtor to pay $750 to satisfy the debt. This
result, we know, was overturned by the Court of Appeals, which reinstated the
obligation to pay $2000. 45 For our purpose, however, it is the lower court’s
decision that is of interest, because it is only this court that found grounds for
intervention in the first place. This court effectively invalidated the $2000 price
and thus needed to fill a gap. It did not turn to the most reasonable and balanced
term, nor to a term that comports with community standards of fairness. Rather, it
used a one-sided term, just within what it perceived to be the tolerable range.
In credit transactions, the interest rate cannot exceed statutory established
threshold or else it is considered unenforceable usury. But what happens when it
does? What is it replaced with? In one case, the court struck the agreed upon
interest rate of 200% (that was intended to apply to a short term but ended up
applying over a longer duration), and replaced it with a 24% rate. It is not clear
whether this was the maximal allowable rate, but it was somewhat higher than the
prevailing market rates of 18-21%. 46 In Austrian law, for example, a similar
maximal tolerable provision is supplied: a usurious interest rate is adjusted,
brought down to equal double the basic interest rate. In French Law, the excessive
interest rate is reduced only to the extent that they exceed the interest rate allowed
by law. 47 In all these examples, a maximally tolerable criterion underlies the
practice.
2. Arbitration Clauses

44

Frostifress v. Reynoso, 274 NYS2d 757 (Sup. Ct. 1966), rev’d as to damages, 281 NYS2d 964
(App. 1967).
45
Batsakis v. Demotsis, 226 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1949)
46
Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 845 (1991).
47
Hatzis and Zervogianni, supra note 14, at 7-8..
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The same result of implementing the maximally tolerable term is obtained when
the court decides to sever the offensive component of a term and enforce the
remaining part. This practice has been widely followed in the context of
unconscionable arbitration clauses. Consider one of the recent leading cases—
Brower v. Gateway 2000. 48 There, the arbitration term in a consumer contract was
unconscionable because it placed unreasonable filing cost and location burdens on
the consumer. The court vacated these elements, but stopped short of eliminating
the entire arbitration term (as the consumer would have liked). Instead, it
remanded the case to the lower court to figure out a more reasonable arbitration
forum. Specifically, it acknowledged Gateway’s proposal to use a somewhat less
onerous arbitration proceeding (one that Gateway offered its new customers in the
modified version of their shrinkwrap) and instructed the trial court to evaluate
whether this proposed venue comes within the tolerable range.
Many courts apply a similar approach to repair other elements of unconscionable
arbitration clauses. 49 In another case, the court severed only the element of the
arbitration clause that required the buyer to reimburse the seller for its arbitration
and attorney fees, but left everything else in tact, including the one-sided authority
of the seller over the choice of arbitration.50 Or, in another case, when the cost of
arbitration was unaffordable to one party, the court allowed the other party to fix
the problem by making an ad-hoc concession to pay “what we need to pay to
make [arbitration] fair”—even if only so much as to make the arbitration
affordable to this particular plaintiff. 51 Generally, when the arbitration agreement
is found to be patently unconscionable by cutting down individuals’ Federal
statutory rights (such as the right to seek punitive damages), courts have reached
the result that is consistent with the maximally tolerable criterion, either by giving
full force to the severability clauses and vacating only the offensive exclusionary
elements, 52 or by allowing the party who is seeking arbitration to waive the
elements that are unreasonable. 53
But courts do not always resort to this principle of striking down only the
minimum necessary to bring the unconscionable term within the tolerable region.
In the leading California case, Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare, the
court found some elements of an employment arbitration clause to be
48

Brower v. Gateway 2000, 246 A.D.2d 246 (N.Y. 1998).
See, e.g., Swain v. Auto Services, Inc., 128 S.W. 3d 103 (Mo. 2003).
50
Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853 (Mo. 2006)
51
Anders v. Hometown Mortgage Services, Inc., 346 F.3d 1024 (11th Cir. 2003).
52
Id., at 1031-32; Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So.2d 723, 734 (Ala.,2002). But see Sosa v. Paulos, 924
P.2d 357 (Utah 1996) for the opposite result.
53
Ex Parte Celtic Life Ins. Co., 834 So.2d 766 (Ala. 2002) (“a party to a contract can waive a
contractual provision beneficial to that party”).
49
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unconscionable and struck down the entire clause, effectively filling the gap with
a no-arbitration term. 54 The employer argued in vain for a different result, of
severing the unlawful elements in the arbitration clause and eliminating only
those elements. The court rejected this, explaining that it has no vested power to
“reform” a contractual term. In this case, the offensive element was the
asymmetry—only the employee’s claims were directed to arbitration. The court
explained that it would have to add a new, non bargained-for term (“both sides
must arbitrate their claims”) instead of the existing, unreasonable term (“only the
employee must arbitrate its claims”). The court found this affirmative
“augmentation” to be beyond its authority, and thus chose to void the entire
arbitration clause. 55 It thus rejected the application of the maximally tolerable
regime.
This is a puzzling justification. Surely, the contract is “augmented” by a new term
even under the court’s approach. Once the term is struck, the court must supply a
non bargained-for gap-filler—here a no-arbitration clause. The Armendariz court
voiced the concern that it is not for the court to write the contract over for the
parties. But surely partial enforcement of the arbitration clause involves much less
of a variation from the effects intended by the parties than total nonenforcement. 56 The question, then, is not whether the court has the power to
reform the contract—it clearly does. 57 The question is how much of the bargain
needs to be eliminated: only the minimum, rendering the remainder tolerable, or
more than the minimum, rendering the remainder fair and balanced?
It is fair to propose that what drove the court’s decision in Armendariz was not a
formalistic minimalism a-la the Blue Pencil rule. Rather, it was the drive to
reform the contract in a way that is more than the minimum necessary, to attain a
result that is more balanced and fair, rather than one that comports with
bargaining power. It was, in other words, a masqueraded preference for the mostreasonable-term solution to the problem of repairing unconscionable contracts,
possibly justified by the perceived deliberate bad-faith drafting on part of the
employer. But despite the precedent that this case set for defining what constitutes
unconscionability in arbitration clauses, its approach to severability was not
generally followed. Indeed, in other cases, the same California Supreme Court
54

Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal.2000)
Id., at 698 (“Because a court is unable to cure this unconscionability through severance or
restriction, and is not permitted to cure it through reformation and augmentation, it must void the
entire agreement”)
56
Williston and Corbin, supra note 30, at 49-50.
57
UCC 2-302, cmt 2. (“Under this section the court, in its discretion, may […] limit
unconscionable clauses so as to avoid unconscionable results.”)
55
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invoked the severability principle and vacated only the offensive elements of the
arbitration clause. 58
D. Liquidated Damages
Another application of the maximal tolerable terms idea concerns liquidated
damages. It is well-known that courts do not enforce liquidated damage terms that
are clearly excessive and punitive. But what is the damage term that courts supply
instead? While the text-book answer is “compensatory” damages, it is often the
case that compensatory damages can be assessed with more or less accuracy, thus
lie within a fairly broad range of reasonableness, from the low estimates (that rule
out consequential damages and types of avoidable harm) to high estimates (that
include generous measures of potential lost profit). A maximal tolerable term
would replace the unenforceable liquidated measure, not with the average or most
reasonable compensatory measure, but rather with the high end estimate of
expectation damages.
There are some statements in American case law that reject this notion. When an
excessive liquidated damages clause is held unenforceable, it is wholly
invalidated. In these situations, the most that courts are willing to award is the expost proven expectation damages. Courts refuse to apply a method of reducing the
liquidated damages to bring them within the reasonable range. 59 Effectively, then,
courts reject the maximally tolerable regime.
But other legal traditions deal differently with penalty clauses. Under Israeli
contract law, for example, courts are instructed merely to reduce excessive
damages to the level reflecting the magnitude of loss reasonably expected at the
time of contracting. 60 In one case, a liquidated damages clause required the seller
of a business to pay $700 per day of delay in fulfilling his obligations. The seller
was late by 100 days. The court found the liquidated amount to be excessive, and
held that actual damages were probably zero or close to it, because the business
was running at a loss. Still, the court decided to reduce the damages, not to the
actual harm of $0, but instead to $200 per day, explaining that “$200 per day is
the maximal amount that the parties could have anticipated as possible harm from
delay.” 61 A leading commentary states that excessive liquidated damages should
58

See, e.g., Little v. Auto Stiegler, 63 P.3d 979 (Cal. 2002).
For an explicit rejection of the reduce-and-enforce methodology in penalty clauses, see Cad
Cam, Inc. v. Underwood, 521 N.E.2d 498 (Oh. 1987)
60
Contract Law (Remedies for Breach of Contract) 1970, Sec. 15(a), Sefer Ha-Chukkim No. 609.
p. 13.
61
Zaken v. Ziva, Civil Appeal No. 539/92 (Unpublished), p. 4.
59
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be reduced “to the highest level that the court regards as reasonably related the
harm anticipated at the time of contracting…; that is, reduced to the measure
closest to the agreed sum, such that if that measure were the one agreed upon in
the first place, the court would not have been justified in reducing it.” 62 This, in
other words, is the maximally tolerable level.

IV. WHY ARE MAXIMALLY TOLERABLE TERMS USED?
The discussion so far had little to say about the normative justifications for
maximally tolerable terms. It is time to address this issue, if only because it is
now clear that this regime is not merely an intellectual curiosity, but rather a fairly
prevalent solution in a variety of contexts. In light of the fact that the maximally
tolerable term is often selected over the most reasonable term, one wonders what
makes this solution so surprisingly prevalent. This section develops two insights.
First, there is a good reason to repair contracts in a way that maintains bargaining
advantages. Second, there is a built-in doctrinal limitation to the maximally
tolerable approach, which takes care of the problem of incentives-to-overreach.
A. Maintaining the Bargaining Advantage
When bargaining power is unevenly distributed, the strong party will naturally
seek ways to secure advantages in the contract by drafting one-sided terms. As
long as he does not cross the boundary of reasonableness, contract law will
respect and enforce the outcome of the bargain. Given this tolerance by the law to
contracts that are (not unreasonably) one-sided, and in light of the various ways
that the strong party can secure advantage, an aggressive intervention beyond the
minimal necessary might backfire.
The legal standards that determine the boundaries of permissible terms and what
constitutes unconscionability are not always obvious to the drafting party. For
example, arbitration clauses in employment contract that were traditionally
enforceable and still are in many jurisdictions are occasionally held to be
unconscionable by some courts. 63 These terms set out many characteristics of the
62

U. Yadin, CONTRACT LAW (REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT ) 1970, p. 132 (2d Ed. 1979)
(in Hebrew). See also Eyal Zamir et. al, BRIEF COMMENTARY ON LAW RELATING TO PRIVATE LAW
302 (1996) (in Hebrew) (“the measure of reduction of liquidated damages ought to be to the level
for which the element of excessiveness no longer applies…[such that] if that level was set in the
first place, it would not have been reduced by the court.”)
63
Compare Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 862 (2002) (California court holding a
credit card arbitration clause unconscionable because it forbids class actions) with Hutcherson v.
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mandatory arbitration procedure, and there is a degree of uncertainty as to which
would run afoul when challenged in court. Even when the law is clear, parties
who draft contracts are not always informed about the legal standards. For
example, if it is permissible to write a non-compete clause in an employment
contract, is a 25-mile radius marking the non-compete territory excessive? 64 And
even if parties are informed, it is not always clear whether the effect of a
particular provision in the contract will be unconscionable. It depends on the
subsequent circumstances. 65
If the drafting party was not fully aware of the threshold of unconscionability and,
crossing this threshold was not done deliberately (the following section will
discuss the deliberate case.) If the drafting party is punished for overreaching by,
say, replacing the excessive term with one significantly below the maximal
permissible level, she faces a familiar dilemma. Any additional sliver of the
surplus she tries to appropriate trough an incrementally more self-favorable term
has a small upside equal to this increment if the term is enforced, but a downside
of potentially significant magnitude if the term is held to be excessive and
replaced with a mid-range term.
This asymmetry between the benefit and the risk of one-sided drafting could have
two effects on the drafting party. First, it could lead her to draft more cautiously
to assure that she does not bump against the maximal permissible boundary.66 She
will maintain a safety cushion against bumping into the ceiling by forgoing part of
the surplus that she would otherwise extract. This effect alone is not a social cost,
but it may be inefficient once we examine the effect of such extra caution on other
terms of the deal. Second, the drafting party would have added incentive to invest
in information that would enable her to assess the exact location of the boundary.
Such investment has a private value because it can help the drafting party avoid
the need for an overly cautious safety cushion, but it has a low (or zero) social
value. 67
Sears Roebuck & Co., 793 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. 2003) (Illinois court holding same clause not
unconscionable).
64
See Brecher v. Brown, 17 N.W.2d 377 (Ia. 1945)
65
For example, short term credit can have a very high interest rate that reflects not only the timevalue of money, but also the “closing” fees. If the debt is to be paid off as scheduled, the high
interest rate would be tolerable. But if it is not paid off in the short term, the interest rate can
become unconscionable. See, e.g., Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 845 (1991).
66
Craswell & Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J. L., Econ. & Org. 279
(1986).
67
The argument that uncertainty over legal standards can lead parties to invest excessively in
acquitting information has been developed in the literature on the negligence rule. See, e.g.,
Kaplow and Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages, 39 J.L. & Econ. 191 (1996);
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It is the first effect that requires attention. The incentive to moderate the drafting
of a term to avoid bumping against the upper permissible limit may induce the
drafting party to shift her bargaining leverage to other terms of the contract. In
extreme cases, the party with the bargaining power might not enter the contract in
the first place unless she can secure a very favorable term (e.g., a high interest
payment in the face of high risk). In less extreme cases, she might force the other
party to surrender to bad terms that are permissible, but no less costly to that
party. For example, if the law were to apply the maximally tolerable terms, an
employer who is interested in a mandatory arbitration clause or a non-compete
restraint would experiment with drafting such terms, knowing that at worst, if a
court views the term as excessive, it would be corrected only incrementally. But if
the law replaces an excessive term with one that is unfavorable to the employer
(say, no arbitration at all; or eliminating the non-compete restraint), the employer
might be reluctant to draft such terms in the first place, and would use her
bargaining power to insist on lower wages, bonds, or some other costly burden on
the employee. Or, in rent-to-own cases, a seller can replace the option-to-own at a
price that reflects unconscionable finance charges with a perpetual rental scheme
that, while expensive, is less obscure and thus less likely to shock the
conscience. 68 Generally, an aggressive legal intervention in one area of the
contract can shift bargain dominance to other areas, affording no true relief to the
weak party, ex ante.
Some parties might be better off by the “substitution” effect—those that have
more to lose from the inclusion of the excessive term. For example, some
employees benefit from access to court rather than arbitration, if they are likely to
go to court. Some employers benefit from elimination of non-compete restraints,
if they are likely to want to compete against their employer. But for many other
employees, these benefits are less relevant, and the substitution effect on other
terms of the contract (wage, benefits) is more relevant. From their perspective, the
aggressive legal intervention backfires.
It is hard to weight the benefit to some against the disadvantage to others. But
several observations lead me to be skeptical whether the more aggressive repair
strategy would be overall beneficial. First, as long as the law does not resolve the
underlying imbalance of bargaining power, the employer would still be able to
dictate one sided terms. But he may be induced to do so in ways that take away
some of the total surplus or which require a more costly drafting and transaction
Kaplow and Shavell, Private Versus Socially Optimal Provision of Ex Ante Legal Advice, 8 J. L.,
Econ. & Org. 306 (1992).
68
Murphy v. McNamara, 416 A.2d 170 (Conn.1979).
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procedure. Second, from an ex-ante perspective, even if some employees enjoy
the added protection, it is funded to a significant extent by other employees who
care less about the excessive term. The more aggressive the legal intervention in
the excessive term, the greater this cross-subsidy.
This discussion helps explain why, in the current context, it is immaterial whether
maximally tolerable terms are in some other normative sense inferior to the “most
reasonable” terms. Terms that best satisfy the criterion or reasonableness are, by
definition, more consistent with the norms or reasonableness than terms that just
barely make it. The question, though, is not about the morally superior bargain,
the fairest and most balanced one. Rather, it is about repairing or supplementing a
contract where it is clear that one party has all the bargaining power. The
argument for maximally tolerable terms is not that these terms are ideal. They are
probably not. The reason why they may be desirable is that, very much like
standard gap fillers, they do not force upon the parties a costly circumvention.
Put differently, to fully address the underlying problem of uneven bargaining
power and impose fair bargains the law needs to do more than the occasional
tinkering with excessive terms. It is competition policy, not gap-filling rules,
which can make a difference. 69
Granted, these are familiar concerns with the unconscionability doctrine—
whether it can really help weak parties or merely backfire. My argument is that
the policy choice courts face is not all-or-nothing—either provide full protection
or no protection at all. Rather, in calibrating the degree of protection, courts
deciding whether to apply the maximally tolerable regime are exercising a choice
between minimal protection, such that raises less of the familiar “backfire”
concerns, versus greater protection with its suggested costs.
B. Incentive to Overreach
If a party with the bargaining power who is drafting an excessive term expects
that the court would only strike the excessive increment, what incentive does she
have to avoid overreaching? 70 At best, the express term will stand; at worst, it will
be replaced with the most favorable term permitted by law. Why draft a term that
reflects this maximal permissible standard if you can get away with—in fact,
benefit from—drafting a more excessive term? In contrast, if the law were to
69

An example for ‘competition policy’ in the area of excessive terms is the Federal Price Gouging
Prevention Act which punishes a whole class of retailers for raising prices unconscionably in
times of emergency. Federal Price Gouging Prevention Act, H.R. 1252, 110th Cong. §2 (2007).
70
See Central Adjustment Bureau v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 37 (Tenn. 1984) (noting the adverse
incentive problem)
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replace the excessive term with a mid-range balanced term, or perhaps even with
a contra-proferentum provision, the drafter has more to lose from overreaching
and would have an incentive to draft less extreme terms.
This is a powerful objection, recognized by many commentators and courts. 71
Ironically, it is almost too powerful to succeed under its own terms, namely, when
it is invoked to support the most-reasonable term regime. A wrongdoer who
deliberately drafts unreasonable terms can withstand even the more aggressive
reformation of the contract in those few cases in which he is challenged,
continuing his illicit business otherwise. In the few challenged cases he will lose
more than the minimal increment, when the contract is reformed to the most
reasonable term. But if there is a pattern of unconscionable behavior, this
occasional loss will likely be dwarfed by the upside of the illicit gain. To deter
such calculated violations, something more is needed, perhaps even stronger than
the most-unfavorable term. More severe sanctions are appropriate, such as
punitive damages or anti-fraud measures.
The key to reconciling this deterrence objection with the prevalence in practice of
maximally tolerable terms is the distinction between deliberate and inadvertent
overreaching. As argued above, the line between what is permissible and what
would be considered intolerable is not clearly drawn and not always recognized
by the drafting party. At times, the line is crossed knowingly and in bad faith,
exploiting the high likelihood that such overreaching will go unchallenged. Often,
though, the boundaries are not deliberately and maliciously crossed. Rather, the
strong party is choosing one way to exploit her bargaining power—and could
have easily chosen other ways that would have been deemed legitimate.
To account for this distinction between the type of offense, the scope of the
maximally tolerable terms regime needs to be restricted. The regime would apply
only when the strong party did not knowingly and deliberately overreach. If the
boundary of permissible terms is known and nevertheless crossed, counting on the
majority of parties to capitulate, the term should be replaced in a way that
provides deterrence—something significantly less then the maximally tolerable
term (and, I would argue, significantly less than the most reasonable terms as

71

White and Summers, supra note 3, at 234-35; Craswell, supra note 9, at 16-17; Walker v.
Sheldon, 179 N.E.2d 497 (1961); Machtinger v. HOJ Industries Ltd., [1992] 1 S.C.R 986 (“if the
only sanction that employers potentially face for failure to comply with the minimum notice
periods prescribed the Act is and order that they minimally comply with the Act, employers will
have little incentive to make contracts with their employees that comply with the Act.”)
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well. 72 ) A good example is the minimum wage law, which sets a clear and bright
line between tolerable and intolerable wages. An employer that pays less than
minimum wage cannot plead ignorance. Accordingly, the statute awards the
aggrieved employee more than the minimally tolerable wages—it doubles the
unpaid wages. 73 But if the boundary is fuzzy and was violated without bad faith,
the law would only reduce the excessive term back to the boundary—to the
maximally tolerable level. This regime would not lead to overly cautious drafting;
and at the same time, it would give the drafting party something to lose in cases in
which the unreasonable term was knowingly inserted.
This conditional application of the maximally tolerable terms regime is consistent
with the observed practice. 74 When the drafter is a repeat transactor dealing in
matters for which it is easy to know what the maximal standards are, a term that
violates a standard is presumptively bad faith, replaced with the most reasonable
term. 75 Or when the crossing of the boundary was egregious, demonstrating a
deliberate disregard of the threshold, an aggressive intervention is again more
justified as a deterrent. 76 With these safeguards in place, we can now better
understand why maximally tolerable terms are quite so prevalent.

72

One possible solution is punitive damages; another is government enforcement. Both solutions
are used in the case of deliberate price gouging. See Federal Price Gouging Prevention Act, H.R.
1252, 110th Cong. §3 (2007) (Enforcement by FTC with fines of up to $3 million) and §4 (stiff
criminal penalties – up to $150 million and 10 years of imprisonment).
73
Fair labor Standard Act, 29 U.S.C.A §16(b).
74
See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 347 (4th Ed. 2004) (“absent a showing that [the excessive
clause] was drafted in good faith…, the court may fix a lesser restraint that it would allowed the
parties themselves to fix in their agreement.”)
75
See Machtinger v. HOJ Industries Ltd., [1992] 1 S.C.R 986, where it was presumed that an
employer who drafted a term in violation of statutory minimum protection standards knew that
this was a violation.
76
See, e.g., Central Adjustment Bureau v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 37 (Tenn.1984), where the
court notes:
“We recognize the force of the objection that judicial modification could permit an employer
to insert oppressive and unnecessary restrictions into a contract knowing that the courts can
modify and enforce the covenant on reasonable terms. […] the employer may have nothing to
lose by going to court, thereby provoking needless litigation. If there is credible evidence to
sustain a finding that a contract is deliberately unreasonable and oppressive, then the
covenant is invalid.”
See also Jenkins v. Jenkins Irrigation, 259 S.E.2d 47, 51 (Ga. 1979). The same practice is followed
in England. Compare Mason v. Provident Clothing & Supply Co. Ltd., [1913] AC 724 (the entire
non-compete clause is severed when drafted in deliberately unreasonable fashion) with Goldsoll v.
Goldman, [1915] 1 Ch. 292 (with no evidence of deliberate overreaching, only the unreasonable
increment is severed.)
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article was not to advocate for the general use of maximal
tolerable gap-fillers, but to identify it as a conceptual and practical possibility and
discuss some arguments in support of such a regime. Upon first encounter, I
imagine, readers were likely to be skeptical. If a court already goes into the
trouble of reforming a contract, why not provide the most reasonable repair? And
indeed, the argument in favor of the most-reasonable-terms is compelling and
intuitive, quite easy to make. Yet despite this inclination, I set out in this article to
explore an alternative. I found surprising pervasiveness in the use of maximally
tolerable terms, in scattered areas of American contract law, as well as in
comparative law. That this principle managed to permeate the law so broadly
suggested to me that in some more subtle ways it can be justified, or at least
grounded in broader existing practices, and it can trump even the hard-wired
predisposition in favor of the most-reasonable-terms criterion.
In the end, I find the incentive problem to be the most troubling one. Would this
regime of maximally tolerable terms encourage parties to draft excessive and
unconscionable terms? If this concern is the crucial one, and I think it is, it marks
the limits of this approach. If the boundary of permissible contracting is easily
known and nevertheless crossed, the term should be replaced in a way that
provides deterrence—something significantly less then the maximally tolerable
term. In fact, true deterrence may require some kind of punitive response. But if
the threshold is fuzzy and was violated without bad faith, the law would only
reduce the excessive term back to the threshold—to the maximally tolerable level.
This principle of maximally tolerable terms is part of my more ambitious thesis,
that bargaining power matters for contract doctrine. In a companion paper, I argue
that bargaining power should affect the way courts supplement true gaps in
contracts. 77 The gap-fillers should mimic the bargain that the parties would have
struck, even if that bargain favors one of the parties. Maximally tolerable terms, in
my view, are a species of bargain-mimicking terms. They are favorable to the
party with the bargaining power, mimicking to the maximally permissible level
the bargain of the parties.

77

Ben-Shahar, supra note 1.
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